Many scholars have theorized that economic development, particularly industrialization and urbanization, contributes to the growth of participatory democracy; according to this theory, it would seem logical that women would both demand and gain suffrage in ever greater numbers whenever economic development expanded their economic opportunities. However, the economic development theory is inadequate to explain certain historical facts about the implementation of women's suffrage. For example, why was women's suffrage, instituted nationally in the United States in 1920, not instituted nationally in Switzerland until the 1970's? Industrialization was well advanced in both countries by 1920: over 33 percent of American workers were employed in various industries, as compared to 44 percent of Swiss workers. Granted, Switzerland and the United States diverged in the degree to which the expansion of industry coincided with the degree of urbanization: only 29 percent of the Swiss population lived in cities of 10,000 or more inhabitants by 1920. However, urbanization cannot fully explain women's suffrage. Within the United States prior to 1920, for example, only less urbanized states had granted women suffrage. Similarly, less urbanized countries such as Cambodia and Ghana had voting rights for women long before Switzerland did. It is true that Switzerland's urbanized cantons (political subdivisions) generally enacted women's suffrage legislation earlier than did rural cantons. However, these cantons often shared other characteristics—similar linguistic backgrounds and strong leftist parties—that may help to explain this phenomenon.
Many scholars have theorized that economic development, particularly industrialization and urbanization, contributes to the growth of participatory democracy; according to this theory, it would seem logical that women would both demand and gain suffrage in ever greater numbers whenever economic development expanded their economic opportunities. However, the economic development theory is inadequate to explain certain historical facts about the implementation of women's suffrage. For example, why was women's suffrage, instituted nationally in the United States in 1920, not instituted nationally in Switzerland until the 1970's? Industrialization was well advanced in both countries by 1920: over 33 percent of American workers were employed in various industries, as compared to 44 percent of Swiss workers. Granted, Switzerland and the United States diverged in the degree to which the expansion of industry coincided with the degree of urbanization: only 29 percent of the Swiss population lived in cities of 10,000 or more inhabitants by 1920. However, urbanization cannot fully explain women's suffrage. Within the United States prior to 1920, for example, only less urbanized states had granted women suffrage. Similarly, less urbanized countries such as Cambodia and Ghana had voting rights for women long before Switzerland did. It is true that Switzerland's urbanized cantons (political subdivisions) generally enacted women's suffrage legislation earlier than did rural cantons. However, these cantons often shared other characteristics—similar linguistic backgrounds and strong leftist parties—that may help to explain this phenomenon.
Many scholars have theorized that economic development, particularly industrialization and urbanization, contributes to the growth of participatory democracy; according to this theory, it would seem logical that women would both demand and gain suffrage in ever greater numbers whenever economic development expanded their economic opportunities. However, the economic development theory is inadequate to explain certain historical facts about the implementation of women's suffrage. For example, why was women's suffrage, instituted nationally in the United States in 1920, not instituted nationally in Switzerland until the 1970's? Industrialization was well advanced in both countries by 1920: over 33 percent of American workers were employed in various industries, as compared to 44 percent of Swiss workers. Granted, Switzerland and the United States diverged in the degree to which the expansion of industry coincided with the degree of urbanization: only 29 percent of the Swiss population lived in cities of 10,000 or more inhabitants by 1920. However, urbanization cannot fully explain women's suffrage. Within the United States prior to 1920, for example, only less urbanized states had granted women suffrage. Similarly, less urbanized countries such as Cambodia and Ghana had voting rights for women long before Switzerland did. It is true that Switzerland's urbanized cantons (political subdivisions) generally enacted women's suffrage legislation earlier than did rural cantons. However, these cantons often shared other characteristics—similar linguistic backgrounds and strong leftist parties—that may help to explain this phenomenon.
Behavior science courses should be gaining prominence in business school curricula. Recent theoretical work convincingly shows why behavioral factors such as organizational culture and employee relations are among the few remaining sources of sustainable competitive advantage in modern organizations. Furthermore, empirical evidence demonstrates clear linkages between human resource (HR) practices based in the behavioral sciences and various aspects of a firm's financial success. Additionally, some of the world's most successful organizations have made unique HR practices a core element of their overall business strategies.
Yet the behavior sciences are struggling for credibility in many business schools. Surveys show that business students often regard behavioral studies as peripheral to the mainstream business curriculum. This perception can be explained by the fact that business students, hoping to increase their attractiveness to prospective employers, are highly sensitive to business norms and practices, and current business practices have generally been moving away from an emphasis on understanding human behavior and toward more mechanistic organizational models. Furthermore, the status of HR professionals within organizations tends to be lower than that of other executives.
Students' perceptions would matter less if business schools were not increasingly dependent on external funding——form legislatures, businesses, and private foundations——for survival. Concerned with their institutions' ability to attract funding, administrators are increasingly targeting low-enrollment courses and degree programs for elimination.
Behavior science courses should be gaining prominence in business school curricula. Recent theoretical work convincingly shows why behavioral factors such as organizational culture and employee relations are among the few remaining sources of sustainable competitive advantage in modern organizations. Furthermore, empirical evidence demonstrates clear linkages between human resource (HR) practices based in the behavioral sciences and various aspects of a firm's financial success. Additionally, some of the world's most successful organizations have made unique HR practices a core element of their overall business strategies.
Yet the behavior sciences are struggling for credibility in many business schools. Surveys show that business students often regard behavioral studies as peripheral to the mainstream business curriculum. This perception can be explained by the fact that business students, hoping to increase their attractiveness to prospective employers, are highly sensitive to business norms and practices, and current business practices have generally been moving away from an emphasis on understanding human behavior and toward more mechanistic organizational models. Furthermore, the status of HR professionals within organizations tends to be lower than that of other executives.
Students' perceptions would matter less if business schools were not increasingly dependent on external funding——form legislatures, businesses, and private foundations——for survival. Concerned with their institutions' ability to attract funding, administrators are increasingly targeting low-enrollment courses and degree programs for elimination.
Behavior science courses should be gaining prominence in business school curricula. Recent theoretical work convincingly shows why behavioral factors such as organizational culture and employee relations are among the few remaining sources of sustainable competitive advantage in modern organizations. Furthermore, empirical evidence demonstrates clear linkages between human resource (HR) practices based in the behavioral sciences and various aspects of a firm's financial success. Additionally, some of the world's most successful organizations have made unique HR practices a core element of their overall business strategies.
Yet the behavior sciences are struggling for credibility in many business schools. Surveys show that business students often regard behavioral studies as peripheral to the mainstream business curriculum. This perception can be explained by the fact that business students, hoping to increase their attractiveness to prospective employers, are highly sensitive to business norms and practices, and current business practices have generally been moving away from an emphasis on understanding human behavior and toward more mechanistic organizational models. Furthermore, the status of HR professionals within organizations tends to be lower than that of other executives.
Students' perceptions would matter less if business schools were not increasingly dependent on external funding——form legislatures, businesses, and private foundations——for survival. Concerned with their institutions' ability to attract funding, administrators are increasingly targeting low-enrollment courses and degree programs for elimination.
Behavior science courses should be gaining prominence in business school curricula. Recent theoretical work convincingly shows why behavioral factors such as organizational culture and employee relations are among the few remaining sources of sustainable competitive advantage in modern organizations. Furthermore, empirical evidence demonstrates clear linkages between human resource (HR) practices based in the behavioral sciences and various aspects of a firm's financial success. Additionally, some of the world's most successful organizations have made unique HR practices a core element of their overall business strategies.
Yet the behavior sciences are struggling for credibility in many business schools. Surveys show that business students often regard behavioral studies as peripheral to the mainstream business curriculum. This perception can be explained by the fact that business students, hoping to increase their attractiveness to prospective employers, are highly sensitive to business norms and practices, and current business practices have generally been moving away from an emphasis on understanding human behavior and toward more mechanistic organizational models. Furthermore, the status of HR professionals within organizations tends to be lower than that of other executives.
Students' perceptions would matter less if business schools were not increasingly dependent on external funding——form legislatures, businesses, and private foundations——for survival. Concerned with their institutions' ability to attract funding, administrators are increasingly targeting low-enrollment courses and degree programs for elimination.
Most pre-1990 literature on businesses' use of information technology(IT)-defined as any form of computer-based information system-focused on spectacular IT successes and reflected a general optimism concerning IT's potential as a resource for creating competitive advantage. But toward the end of the 1980's, some economists spoke of a "productivity paradox": despite huge IT investments, most notably in the service sectors, productivity stagnated. In the retail industry, for example, in which IT had been widely adopted during the 1980's, productivity (average output per hour) rose at an average annual rate of 1.1 percent between 1973 and 1989, compared with 2.4 percent in the preceding 25-year period. Proponents of IT argued that it takes both time and a critical mass of investment for IT to yield benefits, and some suggested that growth figures for the 1990's proved these benefits were finally being realized. They also argued that measures of productivity ignore what would have happened without investments in IT-productivity gains might have been even lower. There were even claims that IT had improved the performance of the service sector significantly, although macroeconomic measures of productivity did not reflect the improvement.
But some observers questioned why, if IT had conferred economic value, it did not produce direct competitive advantages for individual firms. Resource-based theory offers an answer, asserting that, in general, firms gain competitive advantages by accumulating resources that are economically valuable, relatively scarce, and not easily replicated. According to a recent study of retail firms, which confirmed that IT has become pervasive and relatively easy to acquire, IT by itself appeared to have conferred little advantage. In fact, though little evidence of any direct effect was found, the frequent negative correlations between IT and performance suggested that IT had probably weakened some firms' competitive positions. However, firms' human resources, in and of themselves, did explain improved performance, and some firms gained IT-related advantages by merging IT with complementary resources, particularly human resources. The findings support the notion, founded in resource-based theory, that competitive advantages do not arise from easily replicated resources, no matter how impressive or economically valuable they may be, but from complex, intangible resources."
Most pre-1990 literature on businesses' use of information technology(IT)-defined as any form of computer-based information system-focused on spectacular IT successes and reflected a general optimism concerning IT's potential as a resource for creating competitive advantage. But toward the end of the 1980's, some economists spoke of a "productivity paradox": despite huge IT investments, most notably in the service sectors, productivity stagnated. In the retail industry, for example, in which IT had been widely adopted during the 1980's, productivity (average output per hour) rose at an average annual rate of 1.1 percent between 1973 and 1989, compared with 2.4 percent in the preceding 25-year period. Proponents of IT argued that it takes both time and a critical mass of investment for IT to yield benefits, and some suggested that growth figures for the 1990's proved these benefits were finally being realized. They also argued that measures of productivity ignore what would have happened without investments in IT-productivity gains might have been even lower. There were even claims that IT had improved the performance of the service sector significantly, although macroeconomic measures of productivity did not reflect the improvement.
But some observers questioned why, if IT had conferred economic value, it did not produce direct competitive advantages for individual firms. Resource-based theory offers an answer, asserting that, in general, firms gain competitive advantages by accumulating resources that are economically valuable, relatively scarce, and not easily replicated. According to a recent study of retail firms, which confirmed that IT has become pervasive and relatively easy to acquire, IT by itself appeared to have conferred little advantage. In fact, though little evidence of any direct effect was found, the frequent negative correlations between IT and performance suggested that IT had probably weakened some firms' competitive positions. However, firms' human resources, in and of themselves, did explain improved performance, and some firms gained IT-related advantages by merging IT with complementary resources, particularly human resources. The findings support the notion, founded in resource-based theory, that competitive advantages do not arise from easily replicated resources, no matter how impressive or economically valuable they may be, but from complex, intangible resources."
Most pre-1990 literature on businesses' use of information technology(IT)-defined as any form of computer-based information system-focused on spectacular IT successes and reflected a general optimism concerning IT's potential as a resource for creating competitive advantage. But toward the end of the 1980's, some economists spoke of a "productivity paradox": despite huge IT investments, most notably in the service sectors, productivity stagnated. In the retail industry, for example, in which IT had been widely adopted during the 1980's, productivity (average output per hour) rose at an average annual rate of 1.1 percent between 1973 and 1989, compared with 2.4 percent in the preceding 25-year period. Proponents of IT argued that it takes both time and a critical mass of investment for IT to yield benefits, and some suggested that growth figures for the 1990's proved these benefits were finally being realized. They also argued that measures of productivity ignore what would have happened without investments in IT-productivity gains might have been even lower. There were even claims that IT had improved the performance of the service sector significantly, although macroeconomic measures of productivity did not reflect the improvement.
But some observers questioned why, if IT had conferred economic value, it did not produce direct competitive advantages for individual firms. Resource-based theory offers an answer, asserting that, in general, firms gain competitive advantages by accumulating resources that are economically valuable, relatively scarce, and not easily replicated. According to a recent study of retail firms, which confirmed that IT has become pervasive and relatively easy to acquire, IT by itself appeared to have conferred little advantage. In fact, though little evidence of any direct effect was found, the frequent negative correlations between IT and performance suggested that IT had probably weakened some firms' competitive positions. However, firms' human resources, in and of themselves, did explain improved performance, and some firms gained IT-related advantages by merging IT with complementary resources, particularly human resources. The findings support the notion, founded in resource-based theory, that competitive advantages do not arise from easily replicated resources, no matter how impressive or economically valuable they may be, but from complex, intangible resources."
Most pre-1990 literature on businesses' use of information technology(IT)-defined as any form of computer-based information system-focused on spectacular IT successes and reflected a general optimism concerning IT's potential as a resource for creating competitive advantage. But toward the end of the 1980's, some economists spoke of a "productivity paradox": despite huge IT investments, most notably in the service sectors, productivity stagnated. In the retail industry, for example, in which IT had been widely adopted during the 1980's, productivity (average output per hour) rose at an average annual rate of 1.1 percent between 1973 and 1989, compared with 2.4 percent in the preceding 25-year period. Proponents of IT argued that it takes both time and a critical mass of investment for IT to yield benefits, and some suggested that growth figures for the 1990's proved these benefits were finally being realized. They also argued that measures of productivity ignore what would have happened without investments in IT-productivity gains might have been even lower. There were even claims that IT had improved the performance of the service sector significantly, although macroeconomic measures of productivity did not reflect the improvement.
But some observers questioned why, if IT had conferred economic value, it did not produce direct competitive advantages for individual firms. Resource-based theory offers an answer, asserting that, in general, firms gain competitive advantages by accumulating resources that are economically valuable, relatively scarce, and not easily replicated. According to a recent study of retail firms, which confirmed that IT has become pervasive and relatively easy to acquire, IT by itself appeared to have conferred little advantage. In fact, though little evidence of any direct effect was found, the frequent negative correlations between IT and performance suggested that IT had probably weakened some firms' competitive positions. However, firms' human resources, in and of themselves, did explain improved performance, and some firms gained IT-related advantages by merging IT with complementary resources, particularly human resources. The findings support the notion, founded in resource-based theory, that competitive advantages do not arise from easily replicated resources, no matter how impressive or economically valuable they may be, but from complex, intangible resources."
Even more than mountainside slides of mud or snow, naturally occurring forest fires promote the survival of aspen trees. Aspens' need for fire may seem illogical since aspens are particularly vulnerable to fires; whereas
the bark of most trees] consists of dead cells, the aspen's bark is a living, functioning tissue that—along with the rest of the tree—succumbs quickly to fire.
The explanation is that each aspen, while appearing to exist separately as a single tree, is in fact only the stem or shoot of a far larger organism. A group of thousands of aspens can actually constitute a single organism, called a clone, that shares an interconnected root system and a unique set of genes. Thus, when one aspen—a single stem—dies, the entire clone is affected. While alive, a stem sends hormones into the root system to suppress formation of further stems. But when the stem dies, its hormone signal also ceases. If a clone loses many stems simultaneously, the resulting hormonal imbalance triggers a huge increase in new, rapidly growing shoots that can outnumber the ones destroyed. An aspen grove needs to experience fire or some other disturbance regularly, or it will fail to regenerate and spread. Instead, coniferous trees will invade the aspen grove's borders and increasingly block out sunlight needed by the aspens.
Even more than mountainside slides of mud or snow, naturally occurring forest fires promote the survival of aspen trees. Aspens' need for fire may seem illogical since aspens are particularly vulnerable to fires; whereas
the bark of most trees] consists of dead cells, the aspen's bark is a living, functioning tissue that—along with the rest of the tree—succumbs quickly to fire.
The explanation is that each aspen, while appearing to exist separately as a single tree, is in fact only the stem or shoot of a far larger organism. A group of thousands of aspens can actually constitute a single organism, called a clone, that shares an interconnected root system and a unique set of genes. Thus, when one aspen—a single stem—dies, the entire clone is affected. While alive, a stem sends hormones into the root system to suppress formation of further stems. But when the stem dies, its hormone signal also ceases. If a clone loses many stems simultaneously, the resulting hormonal imbalance triggers a huge increase in new, rapidly growing shoots that can outnumber the ones destroyed. An aspen grove needs to experience fire or some other disturbance regularly, or it will fail to regenerate and spread. Instead, coniferous trees will invade the aspen grove's borders and increasingly block out sunlight needed by the aspens.
Even more than mountainside slides of mud or snow, naturally occurring forest fires promote the survival of aspen trees. Aspens' need for fire may seem illogical since aspens are particularly vulnerable to fires; whereas
the bark of most trees] consists of dead cells, the aspen's bark is a living, functioning tissue that—along with the rest of the tree—succumbs quickly to fire.
The explanation is that each aspen, while appearing to exist separately as a single tree, is in fact only the stem or shoot of a far larger organism. A group of thousands of aspens can actually constitute a single organism, called a clone, that shares an interconnected root system and a unique set of genes. Thus, when one aspen—a single stem—dies, the entire clone is affected. While alive, a stem sends hormones into the root system to suppress formation of further stems. But when the stem dies, its hormone signal also ceases. If a clone loses many stems simultaneously, the resulting hormonal imbalance triggers a huge increase in new, rapidly growing shoots that can outnumber the ones destroyed. An aspen grove needs to experience fire or some other disturbance regularly, or it will fail to regenerate and spread. Instead, coniferous trees will invade the aspen grove's borders and increasingly block out sunlight needed by the aspens.