Because the framers of the United States Constitution (written in 1787) believed that protecting property rights relating to inventions would encourage the new nation's economic growth, they gave Congress—the national legislature—a constitutional mandate to grant patents for inventions. The resulting patent system has served as a model for those in other nations. Recently, however, scholars have questioned whether the American system helped achieve the framers' goals. These scholars have contended that from 1794 to roughly 1830, American inventors were unable to enforce property rights because judges were “ antipatent ” and routinely invalidated patents for arbitrary reasons. This argument is based partly on examination of court decisions in cases where patent holders (“patentees”) brought suit alleging infringement of their patent rights. In the 1820s, for instance, 75 percent of verdicts were decided against the patentee. The proportion of verdicts for the patentee began to increase in the 1830s, suggesting to these scholars that judicial attitudes toward patent rights began shifting then.
Not all patent disputes in the early nineteenth century were litigated, however, and litigated cases were not drawn randomly from the population of disputes. Therefore the rate of verdicts in favor of patentees cannot be used by itself to gauge changes in judicial attitudes or enforceability of patent rights. If early judicial decisions were prejudiced against patentees, one might expect the subsequent courts—allegedly more supportive of patent rights—would reject the former legal precedents. But pre-1830 cases have been cited as frequently as later decisions, and they continue to be cited today, suggesting that the early decisions, many of which clearly declared that patent rights were a just recompense for inventive ingenuity, provided a lasting foundation for patent law. The proportion of judicial decisions in favor of patentees began to increase during the 1830s because of a change in the underlying population of cases brought to trial. This change was partly due to an 1836 revision to the patent system: an examination procedure, still in use today, was instituted in which each application is scrutinized for its adherence to patent law. Previously, patents were automatically granted upon payment of a $30 fee.
Because the framers of the United States Constitution (written in 1787) believed that protecting property rights relating to inventions would encourage the new nation's economic growth, they gave Congress—the national legislature—a constitutional mandate to grant patents for inventions. The resulting patent system has served as a model for those in other nations. Recently, however,♦ scholars♦ have questioned whether the American system helped achieve the framers' goals. These scholars have contended that from 1794 to roughly 1830, American inventors were unable to enforce property rights because judges were “ antipatent ” and routinely invalidated patents for arbitrary reasons. This argument is based partly on examination of court decisions in cases where patent holders (“patentees”) brought suit alleging infringement of their patent rights. In the 1820s, for instance, 75 percent of verdicts were decided against the patentee. The proportion of verdicts for the patentee began to increase in the 1830s, suggesting to these scholars that judicial attitudes toward patent rights began shifting then.
Not all patent disputes in the early nineteenth century were litigated, however, and litigated cases were not drawn randomly from the population of disputes. Therefore the rate of verdicts in favor of patentees cannot be used by itself to gauge changes in judicial attitudes or enforceability of patent rights. If early judicial decisions were prejudiced against patentees, one might expect the subsequent courts—allegedly more supportive of patent rights—would reject the former legal precedents. But pre-1830 cases have been cited as frequently as later decisions, and they continue to be cited today, suggesting that the early decisions, many of which clearly declared that patent rights were a just recompense for inventive ingenuity, provided a lasting foundation for patent law. The proportion of judicial decisions in favor of patentees began to increase during the 1830s because of a change in the underlying population of cases brought to trial. This change was partly due to an 1836 revision to the patent system: an examination procedure, still in use today, was instituted in which each application is scrutinized for its adherence to patent law. Previously, patents were automatically granted upon payment of a $30 fee.
Because the framers of the United States Constitution (written in 1787) believed that protecting property rights relating to inventions would encourage the new nation's economic growth, they gave Congress—the national legislature—a constitutional mandate to grant patents for inventions. The resulting patent system has served as a model for those in other nations. Recently, however, scholars have questioned whether the American system helped achieve the framers' goals. These scholars have contended that from 1794 to roughly 1830, American inventors were unable to enforce property rights because judges were “ antipatent ” and routinely invalidated patents for arbitrary reasons. This argument is based partly on examination of court decisions in cases where patent holders (“patentees”) brought suit alleging infringement of their patent rights. In the 1820s, for instance, 75 percent of verdicts were decided against the patentee. The proportion of verdicts for the patentee began to increase in the 1830s, suggesting to these scholars that judicial attitudes toward patent rights began shifting then.
Not all patent disputes in the early nineteenth century were litigated, however, and litigated cases were not drawn randomly from the population of disputes. Therefore the rate of verdicts in favor of patentees cannot be used by itself to gauge changes in judicial attitudes or enforceability of patent rights. If early judicial decisions were prejudiced against patentees, one might expect the subsequent courts—allegedly more supportive of patent rights—would reject the former legal precedents. But pre-1830 cases have been cited as frequently as later decisions, and they continue to be cited today, suggesting that the early decisions, many of which clearly declared that patent rights were a just recompense for inventive ingenuity, provided a lasting foundation for patent law. The proportion of judicial decisions in favor of patentees began to increase during the 1830s because of a change in the underlying population of cases brought to trial. This change was partly due to an 1836 revision to the patent system: an examination procedure, still in use today, was instituted in which each application is scrutinized for its adherence to patent law. Previously, patents were automatically granted upon payment of a $30 fee.
Because the framers of the United States Constitution (written in 1787) believed that protecting property rights relating to inventions would encourage the new nation's economic growth, they gave Congress—the national legislature—a constitutional mandate to grant patents for inventions. The resulting patent system has served as a model for those in other nations. Recently, however, scholars have questioned whether the American system helped achieve the framers' goals. These scholars have contended that from 1794 to roughly 1830, American inventors were unable to enforce property rights because judges were “ antipatent ” and routinely invalidated patents for arbitrary reasons. This argument is based partly on examination of court decisions in cases where patent holders (“patentees”) brought suit alleging infringement of their patent rights. In the 1820s, for instance, 75 percent of verdicts were decided against the patentee. The proportion of verdicts for the patentee began to increase in the 1830s, suggesting to these scholars that judicial attitudes toward patent rights began shifting then.
Not all patent disputes in the early nineteenth century were litigated, however, and litigated cases were not drawn randomly from the population of disputes. Therefore the rate of verdicts in favor of patentees cannot be used by itself to gauge changes in judicial attitudes or enforceability of patent rights. If early judicial decisions were prejudiced against patentees, one might expect the subsequent courts—allegedly more supportive of patent rights—would reject the former legal precedents. But pre-1830 cases have been cited as frequently as later decisions, and they continue to be cited today, suggesting that the early decisions, many of which clearly declared that patent rights were a just recompense for inventive ingenuity, provided a lasting foundation for patent law. The proportion of judicial decisions in favor of patentees began to increase during the 1830s because of a change in the underlying population of cases brought to trial. This change was partly due to an 1836 revision to the patent system: an examination procedure, still in use today, was instituted in which each application is scrutinized for its adherence to patent law. Previously, patents were automatically granted upon payment of a $30 fee.
Because the framers of the United States Constitution (written in 1787) believed that protecting property rights relating to inventions would encourage the new nation's economic growth, they gave Congress—the national legislature—a constitutional mandate to grant patents for inventions. The resulting patent system has served as a model for those in other nations. Recently, however, scholars have questioned whether the American system helped achieve the framers' goals. These scholars have contended that from 1794 to roughly 1830, American inventors were unable to enforce property rights because judges were “ antipatent ” and routinely invalidated patents for arbitrary reasons. ♦This argument♦ is based partly on examination of court decisions in cases where patent holders (“patentees”) brought suit alleging infringement of their patent rights. In the 1820s, for instance, 75 percent of verdicts were decided against the patentee. The proportion of verdicts for the patentee began to increase in the 1830s, suggesting to these scholars that judicial attitudes toward patent rights began shifting then.
Not all patent disputes in the early nineteenth century were litigated, however, and litigated cases were not drawn randomly from the population of disputes. Therefore the rate of verdicts in favor of patentees cannot be used by itself to gauge changes in judicial attitudes or enforceability of patent rights. If early judicial decisions were prejudiced against patentees, one might expect the subsequent courts—allegedly more supportive of patent rights—would reject the former legal precedents. But pre-1830 cases have been cited as frequently as later decisions, and they continue to be cited today, suggesting that the early decisions, many of which clearly declared that patent rights were a just recompense for inventive ingenuity, provided a lasting foundation for patent law. The proportion of judicial decisions in favor of patentees began to increase during the 1830s because of a change in the underlying population of cases brought to trial. This change was partly due to an 1836 revision to the patent system: an examination procedure, still in use today, was instituted in which each application is scrutinized for its adherence to patent law. Previously, patents were automatically granted upon payment of a $30 fee.
Jacob Burckhardt`s view that Renaissance European women "stood on a footing of equality" with Renaissance men has been cited by feminist scholars as a prelude to their presentation of rich historical evidence of women's inequality. In striking contrast to Burckhardt, Joan Kelly in her famous 1977 essay, "Did Women Have a Renaissance?" argued that the Renaissance was a period of economic and social decline for women relative both to Renaissance men and to medieval women. Recently. however, a significant trend among feminist scholars has entailed a rejection of both Kelly's dark vision of the Renaissance and Burckhardt`s rosy one. Many recent works by these scholars stress the ways in which differences among Renaissance women-especially in terms of social status and religion-work to complicate the kinds of generalizations both Burckhardt and Kelly made on the basis of their observations about upper-class Italian women.
The trend is also evident, however, in works focusing on those middle- and upper-class European women whose ability to write gives them disproportionate representation in the historical record. Such women were, simply by virtue of their literacy, members of a tiny minority of the population, so it is risky to take their descriptions of their experiences as typical of "female experience" in any general sense. Tina Krontiris, for example, in her fascinating study of six Renaissance women writers, does tend at times to conflate "women" and"women writers," assuming that women`s gender, irrespective of other social differences, including literacy, allows us to view women as a homogeneous social group and make that group an object of analysis. Nonetheless, Krontiris makes a significant contribution to the field and is representative of those authors who offer what might be called a cautiously Optimistic assessment of Renaissance women`s achievements, although she also stresses the social obstacles Renaissance women faced when they sought to raise their "oppositional voices." Krontiris is concerned to show women intentionally negotiating some power for themselves (at least in the realm of public discourse) against potentially constraining ideologies, but in her sober and thoughtful concluding remarks, she suggests that such verbal opposition to cultural stereotypes was highly circumscribed; women seldom attacked the basic assumptions in the ideologies that oppressed them.
Jacob Burckhardt`s view that Renaissance European women "stood on a footing of equality" with Renaissance men has been cited by feminist scholars as a prelude to their presentation of rich historical evidence of women's inequality. In striking contrast to Burckhardt, Joan Kelly in her famous 1977 essay, "Did Women Have a Renaissance?" argued that the Renaissance was a period of economic and social decline for women relative both to Renaissance men and to medieval women. Recently. however, a significant trend among feminist scholars has entailed a rejection of both Kelly's dark vision of the Renaissance and Burckhardt`s rosy one. Many recent works by these scholars stress the ways in which differences among Renaissance women-especially in terms of social status and religion-work to complicate the kinds of generalizations both Burckhardt and Kelly made on the basis of their observations about upper-class Italian women.
The trend is also evident, however, in works focusing on those middle- and upper-class European women whose ability to write gives them disproportionate representation in the historical record. Such women were, simply by virtue of their literacy, members of a tiny minority of the population, so it is risky to take their descriptions of their experiences as typical of "female experience" in any general sense. Tina Krontiris, for example, in her fascinating study of six Renaissance women writers, does tend at times to conflate "women" and"women writers," assuming that women`s gender, irrespective of other social differences, including literacy, allows us to view women as a homogeneous social group and make that group an object of analysis. Nonetheless, Krontiris makes a significant contribution to the field and is representative of those authors who offer what might be called a cautiously Optimistic assessment of Renaissance women`s achievements, although she also stresses the social obstacles Renaissance women faced when they sought to raise their "oppositional voices." Krontiris is concerned to show women intentionally negotiating some power for themselves (at least in the realm of public discourse) against potentially constraining ideologies, but in her sober and thoughtful concluding remarks, she suggests that such verbal opposition to cultural stereotypes was highly circumscribed; women seldom attacked the basic assumptions in the ideologies that oppressed them.
Jacob Burckhardt`s view that Renaissance European women "stood on a footing of equality" with Renaissance men has been cited by feminist scholars as a prelude to their presentation of rich historical evidence of women's inequality. In striking contrast to Burckhardt, Joan Kelly in her famous 1977 essay, "Did Women Have a Renaissance?" argued that the Renaissance was a period of economic and social decline for women relative both to Renaissance men and to medieval women. Recently. however, a significant trend among feminist scholars has entailed a rejection of both Kelly's dark vision of the Renaissance and Burckhardt`s rosy one. Many recent works by these scholars stress the ways in which differences among Renaissance women-especially in terms of social status and religion-work to complicate the kinds of generalizations both Burckhardt and Kelly made on the basis of their observations about upper-class Italian women.
The trend is also evident, however, in works focusing on those middle- and upper-class European women whose ability to write gives them disproportionate representation in the historical record. Such women were, simply by virtue of their literacy, members of a tiny minority of the population, so it is risky to take their descriptions of their experiences as typical of "female experience" in any general sense. Tina Krontiris, for example, in her fascinating study of six Renaissance women writers, does tend at times to conflate "women" and"women writers," assuming that women`s gender, irrespective of other social differences, including literacy, allows us to view women as a homogeneous social group and make that group an object of analysis. Nonetheless, Krontiris makes a significant contribution to the field and is representative of those authors who offer what might be called a cautiously Optimistic assessment of Renaissance women`s achievements, although she also stresses the social obstacles Renaissance women faced when they sought to raise their "oppositional voices." Krontiris is concerned to show women intentionally negotiating some power for themselves (at least in the realm of public discourse) against potentially constraining ideologies, but in her sober and thoughtful concluding remarks, she suggests that such verbal opposition to cultural stereotypes was highly circumscribed; women seldom attacked the basic assumptions in the ideologies that oppressed them.
Jacob Burckhardt`s view that Renaissance European women "stood on a footing of equality" with Renaissance men has been cited by feminist scholars as a prelude to their presentation of rich historical evidence of women's inequality. In striking contrast to Burckhardt, Joan Kelly in her famous 1977 essay, "Did Women Have a Renaissance?" argued that the Renaissance was a period of economic and social decline for women relative both to Renaissance men and to medieval women. Recently. however, a significant trend among feminist scholars has entailed a rejection of both Kelly's dark vision of the Renaissance and Burckhardt`s rosy one. Many recent works by these scholars stress the ways in which differences among Renaissance women-especially in terms of social status and religion-work to complicate the kinds of generalizations both Burckhardt and Kelly made on the basis of their observations about upper-class Italian women.
The trend is also evident, however, in works focusing on those middle- and upper-class European women whose ability to write gives them disproportionate representation in the historical record. Such women were, simply by virtue of their literacy, members of a tiny minority of the population, so it is risky to take their descriptions of their experiences as typical of "female experience" in any general sense. Tina Krontiris, for example, in her fascinating study of six Renaissance women writers, does tend at times to conflate "women" and"women writers," assuming that women`s gender, irrespective of other social differences, including literacy, allows us to view women as a homogeneous social group and make that group an object of analysis. Nonetheless, Krontiris makes a significant contribution to the field and is representative of those authors who offer what might be called a cautiously Optimistic assessment of Renaissance women`s achievements, although she also stresses the social obstacles Renaissance women faced when they sought to raise their "oppositional voices." Krontiris is concerned to show women intentionally negotiating some power for themselves (at least in the realm of public discourse) against potentially constraining ideologies, but in her sober and thoughtful concluding remarks, she suggests that such verbal opposition to cultural stereotypes was highly circumscribed; women seldom attacked the basic assumptions in the ideologies that oppressed them.
Jacob Burckhardt`s view that Renaissance European women "stood on a footing of equality" with Renaissance men has been cited by feminist scholars as a prelude to their presentation of rich historical evidence of women's inequality. In striking contrast to Burckhardt, Joan Kelly in her famous 1977 essay, "Did Women Have a Renaissance?" argued that the Renaissance was a period of economic and social decline for women relative both to Renaissance men and to medieval women. Recently. however, a significant trend among feminist scholars has entailed a rejection of both Kelly's dark vision of the Renaissance and Burckhardt`s rosy one. Many recent works by these scholars stress the ways in which differences among Renaissance women-especially in terms of social status and religion-work to complicate the kinds of generalizations both Burckhardt and Kelly made on the basis of their observations about upper-class Italian women.
The trend is also evident, however, in works focusing on those middle- and upper-class European women whose ability to write gives them disproportionate representation in the historical record. Such women were, simply by virtue of their literacy, members of a tiny minority of the population, so it is risky to take their descriptions of their experiences as typical of "female experience" in any general sense. Tina Krontiris, for example, in her fascinating study of six Renaissance women writers, does tend at times to conflate "women" and"women writers," assuming that women`s gender, irrespective of other social differences, including literacy, allows us to view women as a homogeneous social group and make that group an object of analysis. Nonetheless, Krontiris makes a significant contribution to the field and is representative of those authors who offer what might be called a cautiously Optimistic assessment of Renaissance women`s achievements, although she also stresses the social obstacles Renaissance women faced when they sought to raise their "oppositional voices." Krontiris is concerned to show women intentionally negotiating some power for themselves (at least in the realm of public discourse) against potentially constraining ideologies, but in her sober and thoughtful concluding remarks, she suggests that such verbal opposition to cultural stereotypes was highly circumscribed; women seldom attacked the basic assumptions in the ideologies that oppressed them.
Jacob Burckhardt`s view that Renaissance European women "stood on a footing of equality" with Renaissance men has been cited by feminist scholars as a prelude to their presentation of rich historical evidence of women's inequality. In striking contrast to Burckhardt, Joan Kelly in her famous 1977 essay, "Did Women Have a Renaissance?" argued that the Renaissance was a period of economic and social decline for women relative both to Renaissance men and to medieval women. Recently. however, a significant trend among feminist scholars has entailed a rejection of both Kelly's dark vision of the Renaissance and Burckhardt`s rosy one. Many recent works by these scholars stress the ways in which differences among Renaissance women-especially in terms of social status and religion-work to complicate the kinds of generalizations both Burckhardt and Kelly made on the basis of their observations about upper-class Italian women.
The trend is also evident, however, in works focusing on those middle- and upper-class European women whose ability to write gives them disproportionate representation in the historical record. Such women were, simply by virtue of their literacy, members of a tiny minority of the population, so it is risky to take their descriptions of their experiences as typical of "female experience" in any general sense. Tina Krontiris, for example, in her fascinating study of six Renaissance women writers, does tend at times to conflate "women" and"women writers," assuming that women`s gender, irrespective of other social differences, including literacy, allows us to view women as a homogeneous social group and make that group an object of analysis. Nonetheless, Krontiris makes a significant contribution to the field and is representative of those authors who offer what might be called a cautiously Optimistic assessment of Renaissance women`s achievements, although she also stresses the social obstacles Renaissance women faced when they sought to raise their "oppositional voices." Krontiris is concerned to show women intentionally negotiating some power for themselves (at least in the realm of public discourse) against potentially constraining ideologies, but in her sober and thoughtful concluding remarks, she suggests that such verbal opposition to cultural stereotypes was highly circumscribed; women seldom attacked the basic assumptions in the ideologies that oppressed them.
Jacob Burckhardt`s view that Renaissance European women "stood on a footing of equality" with Renaissance men has been cited by feminist scholars as a prelude to their presentation of rich historical evidence of women's inequality. In striking contrast to Burckhardt, Joan Kelly in her famous 1977 essay, "Did Women Have a Renaissance?" argued that the Renaissance was a period of economic and social decline for women relative both to Renaissance men and to medieval women. Recently. however, a significant trend among feminist scholars has entailed a rejection of both Kelly's dark vision of the Renaissance and Burckhardt`s rosy one. Many recent works by these scholars stress the ways in which differences among Renaissance women-especially in terms of social status and religion-work to complicate the kinds of generalizations both Burckhardt and Kelly made on the basis of their observations about upper-class Italian women.
The trend is also evident, however, in works focusing on those middle- and upper-class European women whose ability to write gives them disproportionate representation in the historical record. Such women were, simply by virtue of their literacy, members of a tiny minority of the population, so it is risky to take their descriptions of their experiences as typical of "female experience" in any general sense. Tina Krontiris, for example, in her fascinating study of six Renaissance women writers, does tend at times to conflate "women" and"women writers," assuming that women`s gender, irrespective of other social differences, including literacy, allows us to view women as a homogeneous social group and make that group an object of analysis. Nonetheless, Krontiris makes a significant contribution to the field and is representative of those authors who offer what might be called a cautiously Optimistic assessment of Renaissance women`s achievements, although she also stresses the social obstacles Renaissance women faced when they sought to raise their "oppositional voices." Krontiris is concerned to show women intentionally negotiating some power for themselves (at least in the realm of public discourse) against potentially constraining ideologies, but in her sober and thoughtful concluding remarks, she suggests that such verbal opposition to cultural stereotypes was highly circumscribed; women seldom attacked the basic assumptions in the ideologies that oppressed them.